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The cases on this subject during the period covered by this
Survey were of more than routine interest and may be dis-
cussed under these headings: Excessive Damages, Inadequate
Damages, Interest, Funeral Expenses, and Damages for
Fraud.
Excessive Damages
Beasley v. Ford Motor Co." was an action for damages re-
sulting from negligence in the construction and inspection of
a new Lincoln automobile which had caught fire. The plain-
tiff, a passenger in the automobile and the wife of the pur-
chaser, had alighted from the burning automobile without hav-
ing suffered any burns or other physical injuries. She was
not hospitalized and there was no evidence of other expense.
The evidence was that the plaintiff was frightened and made
extremely nervous by the fire, and that a year after the fire
she Was still nervous, suffering from nightmares and not
sleeping well, and continued taking phenobarbital. The plain-
tiff's husband testified that the accident had made her very
nervous, a poor sleeper and irritable. The prayer of the com-
plaint was for $10,000.00, actual and punitive damages. The
issue of punitive damages was eliminated from the case, and
the jury verdict was in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$10,000.00 actual damages which was reduced by the trial
judge to $7,500.00. The Supreme Court felt constrained to
reverse the case and to grant a new trial absolute on the
ground that in view of the slight injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, the verdict was grossly excessive and the result of
caprice, prejudice and bias. It is noteworthy that the Court
considered the fact that the jury's verdict was for the full
amount of the damages sought in the complaint even after re-
moval of the issue of punitive damages from the case as
rather conclusively showing disregard by the jury of the is-
sues and the instructions of the court, or their failure to heed
them. Two justices concurred in result, stating that in their
opinion the record revealed no injuries for which damages
may be recovered, but noting that such question had not been
raised by any exceptions.
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In Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Odom 2, a wrongful
death action, one of the grounds of appeal was that the amount
awarded by the jury's verdict was so grossly excessive as to
indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice and ca-
price. The verdict was for $60,000.00 actual damages for the
wrongful death of a man who apparently earned $58.00 per
week, who had a life expectancy under the mortuary table
of 35.15 years, and whose statutory beneficiaries were four
minor children and a widow who had remarried six months
after his death. The Supreme Court held that the amount
awarded was not excessive.
Inadequacy of Damages
In Fuller v. Bailey,3 where the jury had awarded a $2,000.00
verdict for the wrongful death of a thirty-nine year old house-
wife with a life expectancy of 30.8 years, leaving as benefi-
ciaries her husband, a nineteen month old infant, and two mar-
ried daughters by a former marriage, the Supreme Court
held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in
granting a new trial on the sole ground that the damages
awarded were grossly inadequate.
Interest
In Freeman v. King Pontiac Co.4 the holding of the Court
as to interest is thus summarized in the applicable syllabus:
Amounts recovered by plaintiff in action for breach of
employment contract, from employer, and amounts re-
covered by employer, on counterclaim for automobile pur-
chased by employee, were liquidated and interest thereon
was properly awarded at legal rate.5
The defendant did not raise in the court below the ground that
interest was not recoverable because not demanded in the com-
plaint, and therefore that ground was not passed upon by
the Supreme Court.
In South Carolina Highway Dep't. v. Miller,6 a highway
condemnation case, after a jury verdict in favor of the re-
spondents in the amount of $11,865.00, they moved that in-
terest be added thereto at the rate of six per cent (6%) per
2. 237 S. C. 167, 116 S. E. 2d 22 (1960).
3. 237 S. C. 573, 118 S. E. 2d 340 (1961).
4. 236 S. C. 335, 114 S. E. 2d 478 (1960).
5. 236 S. G. at 337, 114 S. E. 2d at 479 (1960).
6. 237 S. C. 386, 117 S. E. 2d 561 (1960).
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annum from the date upon which the appellant entered upon
and took possession of the land for highway purposes. The
trial judge ruled that such interest was allowable, and from
this ruling the Highway Department appealed after paying
the amount of the verdict. The appellant presented two con-
tentions to the Court: (1) that interest is not recoverable
under the condemnation statutes7 which limit assessments
and damages to the actual value of the land taken and any
special damages resulting therefrom; and (2) that the verdict
of the jury was final and embraced all damages accrued to the
date thereof. As to the first contention, the Supreme Court;
assumed, without deciding, that the "just compensation" re-
quired by the Constitution8 includes interest where the prop-
erty is taken before payment, citing 36 A. L. R. 2d beginning
at page 451. The Court's actual holding was that even if the
foregoing principle is applicable, it was improper for the trial
judge to add interest to the verdict. The Court stated that
the respondents had the duty of calling the matter of interest
on the award to the attention of the trial judge and of re-
questing an instruction on that point so that the jury could,
by its verdict, determine what was "just compensation." The
Court implied that the order of the trial judge adding interest
to the amount of the verdict could not be justified as amending
or readjusting the verdict, since the trial judge's order did
not give the option of a new trial nisi to the appellant.
Funeral Expenses
In Gowan v. Thomas9 the Supreme Court held that funeral
expenses are not recoverable in an action brought under the
Survival Statute.10 It is rather surprising that this issue had
not been squarely passed on previously. However, the Court
had no trouble deciding as it did, in accordance with the
general rule elsewhere," and in line with logic and indications
contained in other South Carolina decisions. There seem to
be two reasons for the Court's holding: (1) Only those actions
which could have been brought by the decedent had he lived
can be brought under the Survival Act, and, obviously, one
cannot sue for his own funeral expenses; (2) It had been
squarely held previously in Petrie v. Columbia & Greenville
7. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 33-121 to -148 (1952).
8. S. C. CONST. art I, § 17.
9. 237 S. C. 223, 116 S. E. 2d 761 (1960).
10. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-209 (1952).
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R.R. 12 that funeral expenses are a proper element of damages
in an action for wrongful death, and to hold that they are
also recoverable in an action brought under the Survival Act
would make the wrongdoer doubly liable for such element of
damages.
Damages for Fraud
The case of Warr v. Carolina Power & Light Co.' s was an
action in tort for fraud and deceit arising from the plaintiff's
sale to the defendant company of a tract of land. The Supreme
Court held that the demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint
should have been sustained because it failed to allege that
the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the alleged fraudu-
lent misrepresentation as to the use which the purchaser pro-
posed to make of the land. Although the complaint contained
allegations to the effect that the defendant company paid the
plaintiff a great deal less than it paid for similar nearby lands,
it did not allege that the plaintiff's land was worth any more
than he received for it. The Court relied on the principle that
"'fraud without damage or damage without fraud is not ac-
tionable.' ,,14 As to the measure of damages, the Court stated
as follows:
In an action for fraud and deceit in the transfer of prop-
erty, the measure of damage is the difference between
the actual and represented value. Beasly v. Swinton, 46
S. C. 426, 24 S. E. 313; Godfrey v. E. P. Burton Lumber
Company, 88 S. C. 132, 70 S. E. 396. In Culbreath v. In-
vestors Syndicate et al., 203 S. C. 213, 26 S. E. (2d) 809,
147 A. L. R. 1144, it was held that the measure of damage
with reference to stock is the difference between the value
of the stock and the value it was represented to have, or
the difference between the contract price and the actual
value.";
12. 29 S. C. 303,7 S. E. 515 (1888).
13. 237 S. C. 121, 115 S. E. 2d 799 (1960).
14. Williams v. Haverty Furniture Co., 182 S. C. 100, 104, 188 S. E. 512,
513 (1936), quoting from Baily v. Merrell, 3 Bulstr. 94, 81 Eng. Rep. 81.
15. 237 S. C. at 132, 115 S. E. 2d at 805 (1960).
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